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Abstract   
The 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe recognises local government as the lowest tier of 
government in a three tier arrangement. Thus, local government, composed by urban and 
rural local authorities, now owes its existence directly to the Constitution and not to 
legislation as was the case under the previous constitutional order. The Constitution assigns 
to local authorities the responsibility to ‘manage’ and ‘represent’ the affairs of people in their 
respective areas. Every local authority is given the ‘right to govern’ its jurisdiction with ‘all’ 
the necessary powers to do so, including devolved powers. Thus, the Constitution recognises 
that, for the benefits associated with decentralisation to be realised, local authorities 
require a certain measure of local autonomy. The autonomy which this Constitution affords 
to local government is however unknown and unexplored, especially from a constitutional 
law point of view. In this article, we measure the degree of local autonomy guaranteed by 
the 2013 Constitution. 
 
1  Introduction 
The role of local government is often underrated even though it is the level of 
government that often has the most significant  contact with citizens. In many countries, 
local governments are responsible for the delivery of basic services such as water and 
electricity supply, refuse removal, sanitation and the regulation of land use. The role of local 
government sometimes extends to a wider range of services and may even include social 
functions such as education and health.1 While the responsibilities of local governments 
vary from country to country, there is no doubt that their functions critically impact the 
wellbeing of citizens. Over the past three decades, various international instruments and 
guidelines have acknowledged this important role of local government as well as the 
institutional design that is considered to be conducive for that role.2 These instruments and 
guidelines particularly emphasise the need to guarantee local government a certain 
minimum level of autonomy in order to maximise the potential to realise the benefits 
                                                          
1 For instance, the local government systems of Zimbabwe, South Africa and Uganda. 
2 See the Africa Charter on the Values and Principles of Decentralisation, Local Governance and Local Development (adopted by the 
twenty-third ordinary session of the Assembly, held in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, 27 June 2014); United Nations Human Settlement 
Programme (UN-Habitat) International guidelines on decentralisation and the strengthening of local authorities, UN-Habitat 2007, 
Nairobi; Council of Europe European Charter of Local Self-Government, Strasbourg, 15.X.1985; Commonwealth Local Government 
Forum, Time for local democracy, the Aberdeen Agenda: Commonwealth principles on good practice for local democracy and good 
governance, London, April 2005. 
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usually associated with decentralisation such as improved service delivery and deepened 
democracy.3  
 
Zimbabwe, like many other developing countries, seeks to use decentralisation to facilitate 
development, democracy and national unity. The new Constitution4 adopted in 2013 
recognises the role of local government in a three tier system of government. It seems to 
grant a certain level of autonomy to local authorities. In general terms, the Constitution 
requires devolution of power, responsibilities and resources to the local level.5 More 
explicitly, it guarantees the ‘right to govern’ of every local authority with ‘all’ the powers 
necessary to do so.6 The precise contours and limits to this local autonomy implied by the 
Constitution is however unknown and largely unexplored. In this article, we measure the 
degree of local autonomy afforded by the 2013 Constitution. The article is premised on the 
well-established notion that local governments play a key role in facilitating development, 
deepening democracy and preserving national unity and that a certain degree of local 
autonomy is necessary to facilitate that role.7  
 
The first part of the article suggests a method for measuring local autonomy which is 
largely informed by international literature on decentralisation. This is followed by a brief 
discussion of the history of local government in Zimbabwe and a discussion of what the 2013 
Constitution provides on local government. The article then proceeds to evaluate the 
degree of local autonomy in the Constitution and suggest legislative reforms where 
relevant. The objective is to contribute towards the process of constitutional  
implementation  with  a  particular  focus  on  local government. Finally, concluding 
remarks are then given. 
 
2 Defining and Measuring Local Autonomy 
Local autonomy can generally be defined as the extent to which local governments have 
discretion in carrying out their duties and obligations. It does not connote freedom on 
the part of local authorities to take whatever decisions they want. Rather, it refers to a 
certain measure of discretion to make laws, adopt policies and take decisions within a 
framework of national or regional laws and subject to national and/or regional 
supervision.8 While there is no universally accepted list of features that constitute local 
autonomy, some basic features can be identified across the literature and international 
instruments on decentralisation.9  
 
                                                          
3 See World Bank (1999), pp. 107–108; Erk (2014), pp. 536–537; Chigwata (2015), pp. 442–443. 
4 Constitution of Zimbabwe, Amendment No. 20 of 2013. 
5 See Preamble of Chapter 14, Section 264(1) Constitution. 
6 See Section 276(1) Constitution. 
7 See Panara (2013), p. 372. 
8 Panara (2013), p. 371. 
9 See Africa Charter on the Values and Principles of Decentralisation, Local Governance and Local Development; UN-Habitat, 
International guidelines on decentralisation and the strengthening of local authorities; Council of Europe European Charter of Local 
Self-Government; Commonwealth Local Government Forum, Time for local democracy, the Aberdeen Agenda: Commonwealth 
principles on good practice for local democracy and good governance; Panara (2013); Tarr (2011); Eaton and Schroeder (2010); World 
Bank (1999). 
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Firstly, local autonomy is reflected by the extent to which the existence of local units is 
guaranteed. Secondly, it is important to consider the functional areas allocated to local units 
and the discretion they have when exercising powers in those functional areas. Thirdly, local 
democracy is a basic feature of local autonomy. The fourth dimension relates to the revenue 
local units have access to and the discretion they have in spending them. Fifthly, local 
autonomy can be measured by assessing the discretion local units have with respect to 
their own bureaucracies. The sixth feature relates to the extent to which other levels of 
government may interfere in the exercise of local powers. These six features are discussed in 
more detail below. 
 
2.1  Security of Existence 
It is not uncommon for central governments to, in one way or another, extol the virtues of 
decentralisation and commit to protecting local government institutions. However, history 
tells us that the intention to decentralise power and resources to local level is not a sure 
enough guarantee that local government’s existence is secure.10 Thus, some measure of 
protection of the existence of local government is vital. This is particularly important given 
that local governments are unlikely to perform effectively if their existence is put in 
constant jeopardy by the ability of higher governments to dis-establish, dismantle, merge 
or dissolve them at any time.11 Security of existence can be understood in two ways. First, 
the existence or importance of local governments as a tier, level or sphere of government 
can be secured or recognised, preferably, in the Constitution. Such constitutional 
recognition serves as a deterrent against executive or legislative invasion of local powers by 
higher government and provides a basis for judicial enforcement of constitutional limits.12 It 
is, however, of little relevance in a country where there is no respect for It is, however, of 
little relevance in a country where there is no respect for the constitution and/or where 
court judgments do not matter. It can also be easily evaded if there are no stringent 
procedures of amending the constitutional provisions protecting local government. 
Secondly, the existence of each individual local government unit, together with its legal 
status and political appearance can be secured. While constitutional protection of each 
local government unit is neither feasible nor practical, a constitution can include measures 
to guard against arbitrary disestablishment or amalgamation of local authorities. 
 
In some countries on the African continent, the constitution not only guarantees local 
government as a level of government but also extends protection to each local government 
unit individually. For example, section 3(6) of the Constitution of Nigeria (1999) 
provides that there ‘shall’ be 768 Local Government Areas and six area councils in Nigeria. 
These local government areas and area councils are then listed by name in the First 
Schedule of the Constitution of Nigeria. This secures the existence of each local 
government unit. The disadvantage is that it is creates inflexible local boundaries. In 
practice, local government boundaries may need to be adjusted to changes in population, 
settlement and movements of people. Some constitutions therefore opt to recognise 
                                                          
10 Tarr (2011), p. 172. 
11 Kalin (1998), p. 1. 
12 Tarr (2011), p. 173. 
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substantive and/or procedural criteria for changing local government boundaries. Such 
mechanisms, especially if coupled with the role of an independent body, have proved 
effective in providing security of existence to each local unit in countries such as South 
Africa 13 
 
2.2  Democracy 
Local  democracy  lies  at  the  heart  of  decentralisation.  In the context of local government, 
it means that voters are allowed to elect local representatives under a legal and institutional 
environment that guarantees regular, free and fair elections. Local autonomy loses 
meaning when local leaders are appointed by higher authorities. Local democracy also 
refers to citizens participating in decisions that affect them. The extent to which a 
constitution recognises this dimension to local democracy is important. Constitutional 
recognition of the values of participatory democracy and the establishment of participatory 
structures and mechanisms can go a long way in promoting a culture of participatory 
democracy. Accessibility and public disclosure of budgeting, procurement, and 
expenditure decisions and processes are a fundamental element of this14  
 
2.3  Powers 
The constitutional protection of local powers provides the assurance that decentralised 
powers will not be recentralised arbitrarily. Further, if local governments are to play a 
meaningful role in facilitating development, their powers ought to be relevant to that.15 
Therefore, it is important to asses not only whether or not powers are  guaranteed  but  also  
whether  the  powers  are  relevant.  The  principle  of subsidiarity may serve as a useful 
benchmark to determine whether local governments are empowered to take charge of 
those functions that are capable of devolution. Furthermore, it is important that local 
powers are clearly demarcated to reduce overlap in responsibilities, cost-evasion, loss of 
accountability and unfunded mandates.16 In addition to being relevant and clearly 
demarcated, it is important to assess the extent to which the allocation of power involves 
discretion or final decision making authority.17 Panara argues that ‘the existence of an 
autonomous sphere of responsibility is one of the essential elements of local 
[autonomy].18 Circumstances (size, demographics, the local economy etc.) in local 
authorities differ. The same applies to their capabilities to deliver and finance public 
services. The model of decentralisation must thus be sensitive to such differences.19 A degree 
of asymmetry with respect to institutions and powers may be achieved, for example by 
recognising categories of local governments 20 
 
 
                                                          
13 See Fessha and de Visser (2015), pp. 87, 90–92. 
14 Ford (1999), p. 14. 
15 World Bank (1999), p. 109. The assignment of functions to subnational governments can be based on considerations such as 
economies of scales, cost–benefit spill overs and proximity to beneficiaries. 
16 Word Bank (1999), p. 124. 
17 Kalin (1998), p. 2; Bahl (1999), p. 5. 
18 Panara (2013), p. 379. 
19 Ford (1999), p. 14. 
20 Bahl (1999), p. 10. 
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2.4  Revenue 
There is no doubt that the extent to which local governments have access to revenue 
determines, to a large degree, their success. The question as to whether local 
governments are empowered by law to raise their own revenue is a critical factor in assessing 
a multi-level government design.  The  principle  that  ‘finance follows function’21 implies 
that local governments should have access to the finances commensurate to their 
responsibilities. Local taxing powers are likely to be of little relevance for revenue 
mobilisation and fiscal autonomy, if they are not accompanied by the right to set tax rates. 
The degree to which local governments control their own budgets and expenditure is a 
further determinant of local autonomy.22 While national governments may require a 
degree of oversight over local budgets to safeguard national interests, the power to reject 
a local budget diminishes fiscal autonomy of local decision makers.23 Hence, the 
recognition of local taxing powers and budget autonomy in the constitution is an important 
indicator of local autonomy. The design of the fiscal intergovernmental system to 
complement local resource-raising efforts is also important given the disparities that often 
characterise most jurisdictions.  
 
2.5  Administration 
Another important aspect of local autonomy is whether or not local governments have 
control over personnel and internal administrative processes. The authority over 
personnel, i.e. the ability to hire, fire and discipline staff frees local governments from 
reliance on higher levels of government and their bureaucracies to implement local policy 
decisions.24 If local governments are made dependent on centrally appointed staff, local 
bureaucrats may feel more accountable to central government than to the local leadership. 
Such authority should be accompanied by authority to determine as far as possible their own 
internal administrative structures, to adapt them to local needs and to ensure effective 
management.25 Guaranteeing this in the constitution is an important measure of the extent 
to which local governments can devise and administer policies within their respective 
jurisdictions.26 There is a downside, however. Administrative autonomy increases the risk 
of elite capture at local level.27 It also increases the risk of inequitable distribution of skilled 
and qualified human resources between urban and rural jurisdictions. Mechanisms to 
address the downside of administrative autonomy are thus required, as explained in detail 
below.  
 
2.6 Extent of Supervisory Powers 
To empower national government to supervise local governments is as important as granting 
local governments autonomy.28 National supervision is necessary to address the challenges 
                                                          
21 Bahl (1999), p. 7, World Bank (1999), p. 124. 
22 Budget autonomy also means that subnational governments do not carry out delegated responsibilities without commensurate 
resources—see Eaton and Schroeder (2010), p. 180; Panara (2013), p. 376. 
23 Eaton and Schroeder (2010), p. 180. 
24 Fessha and Kirkby (2008), p. 259. 
25 UN-Habitat (2009), p. 12. 
26 See Erk (2014), p. 439. 
27 Fessha and Kirkby (2008), p. 251. 
28 Panara (2013), p. 376. 
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usually associated with decentralisation such as elite capture, capacity problems, regional 
inequality and threats to macro-economic instability.29 Supervision is understood here to 
refer to the power to regulate, monitor, support, and intervene in local affairs. With respect 
to regulation, the national government should be able to determine a national legal 
framework within which local governments must operate. It should also be legally permitted 
to monitor the performance of local governments as well as its compliance with the law. 
Regularised audits as well as obliging local governments to report regularly and openly on 
their financial status may serve to improve local governance. 
 
When monitoring reveal challenges that hinder the ability of a local authority to perform its 
functions, it may be necessary for the national government to support that local authority. 
As a measure of last resort, national government should be able to intervene in a local 
authority that behaves illegally by assuming (parts of) its authority. This is the most 
intrusive form of supervision and whether or not it can co-exist with a system of 
decentralised government can only be assessed with reference to the checks and balances 
that surround this instrument. The arbitrary removal of locally elected officials or take-
over of local functions will undermine the decentralised system of government. It is 
therefore important to assess whether there are procedural and substantive criteria for 
intervention and whether the intervention can be reviewed by an independent institution. 
Furthermore, the extent to which the rules for intervention are constitutionalised speaks 
volumes about the protection of local autonomy and the role of national government.30  
 
By way of context to the assessment of local government in Zimbabwe in terms of the above 
indicators, a brief history of local government in Zimbabwe follows below. 
 
3 History of Local Government in Zimbabwe 
Local government has been a feature of governance in Zimbabwe since the colonial times. 
Before then, the institution of traditional leadership comprising kings, chiefs, headmen  and  
village  heads,  was  the  only  governance  structure.31  During  the colonial  era,  local  
government  was  racially  organised. Urban councils were responsible for managing urban 
areas inhabited mostly by whites and rural councils administered only those parts of rural 
areas which were occupied also by whites. Other local institutions—advisory and town 
boards—were established to manage urban areas inhabited by blacks. The successive 
colonial governments exercised indirect rule over communal rural areas, where the 
majority of blacks resided, through the institution traditional leadership and native 
(African) councils.32  The urban and rural councils were well-resourced and had more 
powers that the local government structures established for blacks. This status quo largely 
remained intact until 1979 when the independence settlement was reached at Lancaster 
House between the liberation movements and the Rhodesian and British governments. The 
negotiated Lancaster House Constitution, which became the supreme law of independent 
                                                          
29 See Erk (2014), pp. 11–13; Chigwata (2015), p. 443. 
30 UN-Habitat (2009), p. 10. 
31 Chigwata (2015), p. 445. 
32 Chigwata (2015), p. 446–448. 
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Zimbabwe, did not recognise local government. It only recognised the role of traditional 
leaders. Local government was a creature of national legislation. This   meant   that   its   
existence   and   form   was   determined   by   the   national government.33  Classified into 
urban and rural local authorities, local government could only exercise those powers 
granted by ordinary legislation. The primary pieces of legislation are the Urban Councils 
Act34 and Rural District Councils Act.35  
 
The Urban Councils Act and Rural District Councils Act assigned a range of 
responsibilities and powers to urban and rural councils, respectively.  These responsibilities 
ranged from basic municipal services to welfare services, among others. Taxing powers 
were also decentralised to these local governments to enable them to fund the delivery of 
these services as well as meet other development priorities. The most prominent feature of 
both the Urban Councils Act and the Rural District Councils Act was that they both provided 
for a comprehensive scheme of supervision by the national government. The national 
minister responsible for local government was equipped with a wide array of powers that not 
only allowed him to set policy parameters but also to get involved in the day-to-day 
activities of local authorities. For instance, the Minister had the power to approve by-laws, 
budgets and plans before they could become operational or binding.36 The Minister could 
even rescind or alter decisions of the council.37 The exercise of national supervision has been 
quite controversial during the Lancaster House constitutional order, particularly since the 
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), an opposition party, emerged on the scene in 
the early 2000s. Since then, the MDC has controlled most urban areas, including the 
biggest cities of Harare and Bulawayo, while the Zimbabwe African National Union-
Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) has maintained control of the national government. The 
central-local relations have been acrimonious ever since. Allegations of the Minister using 
his supervisory powers over local government for political gain are widely documented.38 
Local autonomy was compromised in many ways. Some scholars trace the underperformance 
of local authorities to this excessive supervisory role of the Minister both in law and 
practice.39  
 
Under the Lancaster House constitutional order there was very little, if any, that prevented 
the central government from recentralising decentralised powers and responsibilities. 
Since independence, the national government has indeed recentralised a number of local 
responsibilities. For instance, the distribution of electricity, which used to be undertaken 
by selected urban local governments, was recentralised soon after independence. In 2005, 
the central government recentralised the water and sanitation functions and assigned them 
to a newly created parastatal, Zimbabwe National Water Authority. This was a failure, 
                                                          
33 See Mushamba et al. (2014), p. 5. 
34 Chapter 29: 15 of 1996. 
35 Chapter 29: 13 of 1988. 
36 See Section 229(2), 219(1) Urban Councils Act and Section 90(4), 17(1) Rural District Councils Act. 
37 See Section 314 Urban Councils Act and Section 52(3) Rural District Councils Act. 
38 See Kamete (2006). 
39 See Chakunda (2015), p. 4; Mushamba et al. (2014), p. 5, 10; Chigwata (2017), p. 222. 
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however, and the water and sanitation functions were restored to local government.40 In 
any event, the system of local government was premised on strict central control and very 
little, if any, autonomy for local authorities. During the process towards the adoption of the 
2013, it became apparent that there was a desire to shield local government from 
politically motivated interventions.41 The 2013 Constitution therefore grants local 
authorities a certain degree of local autonomy. The remainder of this article focuses on how 
strong this autonomy is. 
 
4 The Constitutional Basis of Local Government in Zimbabwe  
The 2013 Constitution organises government at the national, provincial and local levels. 
Provincial and metropolitan councils make up the provincial tier while the local tier of 
government is constituted by urban and rural local authorities.42 Urban local authorities are 
established to manage and represent the affairs of people living in urban areas, whereas 
rural local authorities govern rural areas. The Constitution permits the establishment of 
different classes of urban and rural local authorities. This system is designed to result in 
asymmetric decentralisation.43 This constitutional provision is an acknowledgement of the 
differences between rural and urban areas and the local authorities there. 
 
Contrary to the previous constitutional dispensation, the 2013 Constitution envisages local 
authorities exercising devolved powers and not only delegated powers. The principle of 
devolution is one of the Founding Values and Principles of the Constitution.44 It is further 
anchored by the Preamble of Chapter 14 which reads: 
 
Whereas it is desirable to ensure: (a) the preservation of national unity in Zimbabwe and 
the prevention of all forms of disunity and secessionism; 
(b) the democratic participation in government by all citizens and commu- nities of 
Zimbabwe; and (c) the equitable allocation of national resources and the participation of 
local communities in the determination of development priorities within their areas; there 
must be devolution of power and responsibilities to lower tiers of government in 
Zimbabwe. 
 
The Preamble itself contains a constitutional instruction to the national government to 
devolve power to lower level governments in order to realise certain goals. Section 264(1) of 
the Constitution further gives effect to the Preamble by stating that ‘whenever appropriate’, 
the national government must devolve powers and responsibilities to local authorities 
‘which are competent’ to carry out those responsibilities ‘efficiently and effectively’.45 The 
obvious challenge with this provision is how to determine when it is ‘appropriate’ to devolve 
power or when a local authority is ‘competent’ to carry responsibilities efficiently and 
                                                          
40 Mushamba (2010), p. 109. 
41 Muchadenyika (2015), p. 111. 
42 Section 5 Constitution. 
43 See Section 274(3), 275(3) Constitution. 
44 Section 3(2)(l) Constitution. 
45 Section 264(1) Constitution. 
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effectively. Given that the Constitution does not specify who decides when it is ‘appropriate’, 
it stands to reason that the national government will make that decision. 
The Constitution lists six objectives of devolution: 
 
a) to give powers of local governance to the people and enhance their participation in 
the exercise of the powers of the State and in making decision affecting them; 
b) to promote democratic, effective, transparent, accountable and coherent government 
in Zimbabwe as a whole; 
c) to  preserve  and  foster  the  peace,  national  unity  and  indivisibility  of Zimbabwe; 
d) to recognise the right of communities to manage their own affairs and to further 
their own development; 
e) to ensure the equitable sharing of local and national resources; and 
f) to transfer responsibilities and resources from the national government in order to 
establish a sound financial base for each provincial and metropolitan council and local 
authority.46  
 
The objective to ‘recognise the right of communities to manage their own affairs and to 
further their development’ is particularly important. It envisages further devolution of 
powers and responsibilities to local authorities.47 The objectives of devolution are 
supported by a set of general principles which are designed to regulate the conduct of 
local authorities. Local authorities are required to: 
 
a) ensure good governance by being effective, transparent, accountable and 
institutionally coherent; 
b) assume only those functions conferred on them by th[e] Constitution or an Act of 
Parliament; 
c) exercise  their  functions  in  a  manner  that  does  not  encroach  on  the 
geographical,   functional   or   institutional   integrity   of   another   tier   of government; 
d) cooperate with one another, in particular by (i) informing one another or, and 
consulting one another on, matters of common interest (ii) harmonising and coordinating 
their activities; 
e) preserve the peace, national unity and indivisibility of Zimbabwe; 
f) ensure the fair and equitable representation of people within their areas of 
jurisdiction.48  
 
These principles regulate both the ways in which local authorities carry out their activities as 
well as the outcome of those activities. For instance, the duty to ensure good governance is 
an outcome while that of cooperating with one another is a means to an end—the end 
being effective multilevel governance. However, the principles are of little use to realise 
the intended outcome unless relevant laws and policies are enacted to give effect to them. 
 
                                                          
46 Section 264(2) Constitution. 
47 Mushamba et al. (2014), p. 5. 
48 Section 265(2) Constitution. 
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The requirement for and objectives of devolution as well as the principles of local government 
discussed above point to a minimum level of autonomy that local authorities must enjoy. 
Local authorities are yet to enjoy such autonomy partially because the legislation, which 
governs and impacts on local government, has not been reformed. 
 
5 Measuring the Degree of Local Autonomy in the 2013 Constitution 
The following assessment of the autonomy for local government in the 2013 Constitution is 
carried out on the basis of the indicators that were discussed in paragraph 2 above. It is 
argued that while the Constitution has identified local government as one of the key actors 
in development and democracy it contains few guarantees for local autonomy.  
 
5.1  Establishment and Disestablishment of Local Government 
The 2013 Constitution provides some recognition for local government by entrenching it as the 
lowest tier of government.49 At a minimum, this means that the national government may not 
modify the general status of local government as a tier of government without amending the 
Constitution.50 However, there is no constitutional protection for individual local authorities.51 
The Constitution does not deal with the process or criteria for the establishment or 
disestablishment of local authorities and leaves this to Parliament to regulate. In terms of the 
current Urban Councils Act and Rural District Councils Act, the national government has wide 
powers to establish, abolish, merge or alter boundaries of a local authority(s) at any time.52 The 
affected local authority and its communities are consulted in the process of abolition, merger 
and establishment of local authorities but it is the national executive that makes the final 
decision.53 Furthermore, there is little, if any, scrutiny by Parliament or any independent body. 
It is argued that, with little or no oversight, there is ample room for these processes to be used 
for political ends.  
 
5.2 Election and Removal from Office of Local Officials 
With respect to the democratic status of local politicians, the 2013 Constitution deepens 
local democracy and thus supports an important aspect of local autonomy. This is borne 
out, firstly, by the objectives of devolution which include the promotion of democratic 
government in Zimbabwe.54 This means that governance structures and procedures should 
uphold and promote both representative and participatory democracy. Secondly, the 
constitutional guarantees for the election of local officials are important in this respect. 
 
5.2.1  Election of Local Officials 
The 2013 Constitution requires ‘all’ councillors of each local authority to be directly elected by 
registered voters within its area of jurisdiction.55 This is a departure from the previous 
constitutional order where some councillors were elected while others where appointed by 
                                                          
49 Section 5 Constitution. 
50 Mushamba et al. (2014), p. 6. 
51 See Mushamba et al. (2014), p. 5. 
52 See section 4, 5, 6 Urban Councils Act and section 6, 8 Rural District Councils Act. 
53 See section 9 Rural District Councils Act. 
54 Section 264(2)(b) Constitution. 
55 Section 265(2) Constitution. 
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the national Minister responsible for local government.56 These appointed officials carried 
out the same duties and were entitled to the same benefits as elected councillors, but could 
not vote in council meetings.57 The appointment of councillors by the Minister was not only 
undemocratic but also used to achieve political goals.58 A study carried out by De Visser 
and Mapuva in 20 major urban local authorities showed that out of 57 appointed 
councillors in these authorities only 2 were affiliated to the MDC while the rest were 
aligned to ZANU-PF.59 This clearly indicates there was tension between the notion of 
democratically elected councils and the central appointment of ministerial representatives 
to councils. By allowing elected councillors only, the 2013 Constitution thus seeks to break 
with this practice and thus deepens local democracy. The result of this new constitutional 
provision is that the current section 4A of the Urban Councils Act and section 11 of the Rural 
District Councils Act, both of which provide for the combination of elected and 
appointed councillors, are unconstitutional.60  
 
5.2.2  Removal from Office of Local Officials 
Under the previous constitutional order, the President could suspend and dismiss any 
councillor in a rural local authority from exercising all or any of their functions if he or she 
considered it ‘necessary or desirable to do so in the public interest or in the interest of the 
inhabitants of a council area’.61 In urban local authorities, the Minister could also 
suspend and dismiss councillors on a number of grounds, including corruption or 
misconduct.62 These powers were exercised controversially, especially in urban local 
authorities.63 Between 1999 and 2008, the Minister suspended and/or dismissed a 
considerable number of councillors and/or councils on varying allegations of poor 
performance, ‘shady’ tendering procedures, corruption, mismanagement and 
incompetence.64 Most of the councillors or councils that were suspended and/or dismissed 
were aligned to the MDC, while the incumbent Minister was aligned to ZANU-PF.65 Arbitrary 
though the suspensions and dismissals may seem to be, the Minister relied on his powers 
under the Urban Councils Act.66  
 
It is as a result of these challenges that the 2013 Constitution tried to reform the supervisory 
mechanism in relation to the suspension and dismissal of locally elected officials. Under the 
new constitutional regime, locally elected officials may no longer be removed from office 
arbitrarily. Section 278(1) of the Constitution now strictly regulates when a councillor 
vacates office. A councillor vacates office when he or she resigns, when the council is 
dissolved or if he or she ceases to be a qualified as a voter.67 A council, by majority 
                                                          
56 See Section 11 Rural District Councils Act and Section 4A Urban Councils Act. 
57 Mushamba (2010), p. 103. 
58 Sims (2013), p. 17. 
59 See De Visser and Mapuva (2013), pp. 170–171. 
60 Section 31 of the Rural District Councils Act requires similar alignment. 
61 Section 157(1)(2) Rural District Councils Act. 
62 Section 114 Urban Councils Act. See also section 107, 108 and 109 Urban Councils Act. 
63 Kamete (2006), p. 38. 
64 Kamete (2006), p. 36. 
65 Chakunda (2015), p. 4. 
66 Kamete (2006), p. 38; Chakunda (2015), p 4. 
67 Section 129 Constitution. 
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decision, may also declare a council seat vacant if the incumbent was absent from the 
council for 21 consecutive days. The other grounds are: if a councillor accepts public office 
elsewhere or if he or she fails to relinquish that office after being elected as a councillor. 
Finally, the seat becomes vacant if the councillor is convicted of a crime. The Constitution 
now provides an exhaustive list of grounds for vacating office and this provision can be used 
as a basis for judicial review. 
 
A councillor may also be removed from office by an independent tribunal provided for under 
an Act of Parliament. The grounds for removal are limited. The first group of grounds relate 
to inability to perform the functions of a councillor due to mental or physical incapacity, 
gross incompetence and gross misconduct. Furthermore, the tribunal may remove a 
councillor from office if he or she is convicted of an offence involving dishonesty, 
corruption or abuse of office. Wilful violation of the law, including a by-law, also 
constitutes a ground for removal.68 The decisions of the tribunal are reviewable by the High 
Court. It is suggested that the introduction of an independent body and the listing of 
specific grounds upon which locally elected officials may be removed from office provides 
protection to locally elected officials that they did not enjoy before. However, much will 
depend on how the Tribunal is constituted and whether it will be able to operate 
independently. As will be argued below, this is where the Constitution is being 
undermined by statutory law. 
 
The Local Government Laws Amendment Act of 2016 was adopted to implement these 
constitutional provisions. It makes provision for the establishment of a three member 
independent tribunal to be established on an ad hoc basis.69 All the members of the 
tribunal, including its chairperson, are appointed by the Minister responsible for local 
government. The Law Society of Zimbabwe nominates individuals for the position of 
chairperson and the Civil Service Commission does the same with respect to the two other 
members of the tribunal. The head of the Ministry responsible for local government must 
provide administrative support to the tribunal.70 Thus, the Ministry responsible for local 
government plays a significant role in the establishment and functioning of this tribunal. In 
a cunning, but arguably unconstitutional move, the Act brings the Minister back as the 
prime overseer of councillors at the expense of the new Tribunal. It does this by stipulating 
that the Tribunal is only competent to consider the dismissal of councillors who have 
already been suspended by the Minister.71 The Act thus creates a distinction between 
suspension and dismissal. The first is the prerogative of the Minister and the second is the 
prerogative of the Tribunal. What is more, the Tribunal’s power to dismiss is  made  
conditional  upon  the  Minister  first  having  suspended  that councillor. It is argued that 
this condition makes it impossible for the Tribunal to exercise its power independently of 
the Minister. Instead, the Act limits the Tribunal’s power to a power to ‘consummate’ a 
suspension that was initiated by the Minister by turning it into a dismissal. This, it is 
                                                          
68 Section 278(2) Constitution. 
69 Section 157A Local Government Laws Amendment Act, 2016. 
70 See section 2, 3 Local Government Laws Amendment Act, 2016. 
71 See section 2(3) Local Government Laws Amendment Act, 2016. 
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submitted, goes against the provisions of the Constitution. While the Constitution offers 
considerable protection to locally elected officials, the Local Government Laws 
Amendment Act undermines this. 
 
It then also comes as no surprise that controversial suspensions of councillors continued 
after the adoption of the 2013 Constitution. Since then a number of councillors from 
Gweru, Harare and Bulawayo have been suspended under disputed circumstances.72 In 
separate cases, the Gweru and Harare councillors challenged the constitutionality of their 
respective (re)suspensions. The Court declared the (re)suspensions illegal and directed 
their reinstatement.73 It is argued that the constitutional and legal framework provides 
insufficient protection against the suspensions and dismissals of locally elected officials, 
orchestrated for political gain. 
 
5.3 Powers and Responsibilities of Local Authorities 
As indicated earlier, the extent and scope of powers for local authorities is an important 
indicator of local autonomy. With respect to this, the new Constitution presents a mixed 
picture. Section 276(1) of the Constitution states that ‘subject to th[e] Constitution and any 
Act of Parliament, a local authority has the right to govern, on its own initiative, the local 
affairs of the people within the area for which it has been established, and has all the powers 
necessary for it to do so’.74 With this provision, which closely resembles section 151(4) of 
the South African Constitu- tion, the Constitution itself seems to allocate powers directly to 
local authorities. It affords a constitutional ‘right’ to each local authority to govern the 
affairs of its people. However, this right can be limited not just by the Constitution (as is the 
case in the South African equivalent to this section) but also by any Act of Parliament. This 
then significantly reduces the constitutional protection offered by this provision. The 
Constitution does not list the powers and functions of local authorities. A system of 
‘enumerated powers would provide some degree of certainty as to what local authorities can 
and/or shall do’.75 Instead, the Constitution gives Parliament the discretion to determine 
local powers and functions through legislation.76 The implication of the lack of 
constitutional recognition of the powers and functions of local authorities is that the 
national government may recentralise them at any time. As observed above, such 
recentralisation has been common in Zimbabwe. 
 
However, it cannot be argued that the 2013 Constitution did not change anything. 
 
Given that it affords every local authority ‘the right to govern’ and ‘all’ the powers 
necessary to do so, it requires that local authorities exercise significant powers and enjoy 
a certain measure of local autonomy. It is suggested that, at a minimum, it means that 
                                                          
72 See Hamutendi Kombayi and Ors v The Minister of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing and Ors HB 57116; 
Manyenyeni v Minister, Local Government, Public Works and National Housing & Another (HH 385-16 HC 5903/16) [2016] ZWHHC 
385 (29 June 2016). 
73 See Hamutendi Kombayi and Ors v The Minister of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing and Ors; Manyenyeni v 
Minister, Local Government, Public Works and National Housing & Another. 
74 Section 276(1) Constitution. 
75 Panara (2013), p. 383. 
76 Section 276(2) Constitution. 
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there are limits to the role of national government in local affairs. Effective protection and 
promotion of such as ‘right’ requires that the excessive supervisory powers which were 
assigned to the Minister under the Lancaster House Constitution (such as the power to 
reverse, suspend and alter council resolutions) be reformed.77 Furthermore, it suggested 
that it also means that the national government is under a constitutional obligation to 
decentralise relevant and significant powers in line with the principle of subsidiarity. 
 
5.4 Revenue-Raising at Local Level 
Local  authorities  in  Zimbabwe  generally  raise  revenue  by  charging  user  fees, imposing 
taxes or accessing grants from the national government. One of  the objectives of 
devolution in the Constitution is ‘to transfer responsibilities and resources from the national 
government in order to establish a sound financial base for each provincial and 
metropolitan council and local authority’.78 The Constitution recognises how important 
financial resources are for the ability of local authorities to effectively perform their 
functions. The question is, however, whether the Constitution goes further than this 
general objective. To what extent does it guarantee local authorities access to revenue? 
 
5.4.1 Taxing Powers 
The Constitution does not assign specific powers to raise revenue to local authorities. 
However, it does provide a general framework and clearly envisages the assignment of 
revenue-raising powers to local authorities so as to establish a sound financial base for each 
local authority.79 It provides that an ‘Act of Parliament may confer functions on local 
authorities, including the power to levy rates and taxes and generally to raise sufficient 
revenue for them to carry out their objects and responsibilities’.80  
 
The Urban Councils Act, Rural District Councils Act and other sectoral pieces of legislation 
assign to local authorities the power impose user-charges, property tax, levies, licencing fees 
and the authority to sell or lease land or buildings.81 However, they prohibit a local authority 
from raising user-charges without the permission of the Minister.82 Not having the final say 
over the determination of tax rates means that  local  authorities  are  unable  to  vary  
rates  in  line  with  local  economic developments to improve revenue mobilisation. 
Furthermore, despite having revenue-raising powers, local authorities actually raise very 
little revenue.83 Two decades of economic hardship has adversely impacted the ability of 
citizens and the business community to pay for services provided. The taxing powers that 
local authorities do control are also not the most buoyant: income tax, company taxes, toll 
fees and vehicle related taxes are all reserved for national government.84  
                                                          
77 See Mushamba (2010), p 107. 
78 Section 264(2)(f) Constitution. 
79 See Section 264(2) Constitution. 
80 Section 276(2)(b) Constitution. 
81 See Section 218, 159, 179, 173, 174, 178, 152, 269, 272; Second Schedule 12, 17; Urban Councils Act and Section 72, 75, 86, 96, 97, 
98 Rural District Councils Act. 
82 Section 219(1) Urban Councils Act and Section 17(1) Rural District Councils Act. The same requirements apply in respect of services 
provided specifically to or in connection with any residential accommodation. 
83 Chigwata (2017), p. 226. 
84 See Mushamba (2010), p. 111. 
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Sims therefore argues that the failure by the Constitution to guarantee the financial 
autonomy of local authorities will perpetuate the marginalisation of local authorities that 
have ‘stunted local development since independence’.85 It is submitted that the 
constitutional objective to establish a sound financial base for each local authority must 
require the decentralisation of taxes to local level. Revenue sources that are capable of 
raising significant revenue for local authorities must be transferred together with a degree 
of discretion in determining taxation rates. The exercise of local autonomy must be 
supervised by the national government. However, the  role of  the Minister should be  
limited  to setting a national framework for each local authority to exercise its powers to 
determine rates with respect to relevant and reasonably buoyant taxes and fees. This 
would go a long way in ensuring that local authorities become more self-sufficient.86  
 
5.4.2  Intergovernmental grants 
In any decentralised system, there will be a mismatch between local expenditure needs 
and the revenue generated locally.87 Moreover, each local authority’s tax base and capacity to 
actually raise revenue will be different. Intergovernmental grant funding must thus 
complement the local revenue-raising effort. Revenue raised nationally must be shared 
among governments at various levels. The 2013 Constitution recognises the need for 
vertical and horizontal sharing of nationally generated revenue. The vertical division of 
revenue distributes portions of nationally generated revenue to the three tiers generally. 
The horizontal division determines what each individual local authority receives. 
 
On the vertical division, the Constitution requires the allocation of ‘not less than five per 
cent of the national revenues raised in any financial year’ to provincial and local 
governments.88 This requirement does not guarantee any individual local This 
requirement does not guarantee any individual local authority any specific amount or 
percentage but guarantees at least five per cent for the entire provincial and local sector. 
Cementing a minimum allocation to the provincial and local tiers in the Constitution 
inserts a degree of predictability into the intergovernmental fiscal system and must result 
in financial resources being channelled to provinces and local authorities.89 However, the 
percentage is too low to guarantee ten provincial governments and 92 local governments 
sufficient resources. Furthermore, the fact that the guarantee applies to both local and 
provincial governments combined does not augur well for local government. Local 
authorities require significant financial resources as they are expected to deliver public 
services. The functions of provincial governments are uncertain at best. Moreover, these 
provincial governments are to be constituted by a majority of officials from the national 
government and may be overseen by nationally appointed officials. This gives them greater 
leverage with national government. Thus, local authorities may lose out to provinces. 
 
                                                          
85 Sims (2013), pp. 23, 2. 
86 See UN-Habitat (2009), pp. 8–9. 
87 See Bahl (1999), UN-Habitat (2009), Ford (1999). 
88 Section 301(3) Constitution. 
89 See UN-Habitat (2009), p. 9. 
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With respect to the horizontal division, the Constitution does not provide a specific 
formula to determine what each local authority receives. Section 301(1) of the Constitution 
directs Parliament to enact a law providing for conditional and unconditional grants to 
provincial and local governments. The allocation of such grants should be informed by 
criteria set in the Constitution. These include matters such as the consideration of national 
interests, the redistribution of wealth and economic resources between jurisdictions and 
disparities.90 The criteria resemble in many respects the criteria for the sharing of revenue 
among the three spheres of government provided in the South African Constitution.91 If 
they are implemented well, the intergovernmental fiscal system may be effective in 
addressing disparities among subnational jurisdictions. In summary, it is submitted that the 
national government must develop, in a transparent and consultative way, an equitable and 
predictable formula for both the vertical and horizontal sharing of revenue informed by the 
criteria of section 30(1) of the Constitution. 
 
5.4.3 Control Over the Budget and Expenditure 
The degree of control, exercised by higher authorities with respect to local budget decisions, 
is another important indicator of autonomy. This form of control is capable of 
considerably limiting the autonomy of local government. It can be used by higher tiers of 
government to by-pass the preferences of local citizens and impose their own political 
agenda.92  
 
The 2013 Constitution does not explicitly grant local authorities the power to adopt their 
own budgets. However, it does anticipate local authorities exercising a variety of 
governmental powers, which can be argued to include budget powers. Section 276(2)(a) 
states that legislation may confer functions on local authorities for the effective    
administration   of   their   respective   jurisdictions.   Moreover, section 276(1) which 
guarantees every local authority the ‘right to govern, on its own initiative, the local affairs 
of its people,’ with ‘all’ the necessary powers to do so, implies a degree of budget autonomy. 
The words on ‘its own initiative’ suggest that local authorities are expected to make 
expenditure decisions within the limits of the law.93  That said, it will be hard to argue that 
the Constitution unequivocally protects the power of each local authority to adopt its own 
budget. 
 
5.5 Administrative Autonomy at the Local Level 
The local government system in Zimbabwe empowers the national government to exercise 
direct control over local personnel issues.94 For example, section 132 of the Urban Councils 
Act demands the approval of the Local Government Board for the appointment of the town 
clerk. This interference has made it difficult for local authorities to adjust their respective 
personnel establishment to local or/and economic needs.95 A degree of constitutional 
                                                          
90 See Section 301(2) Constitution. 
91 See Section 214 Constitution of South Africa, Act No. 108 of 1996. 
92 Panara (2013), p. 385. 
93 See Panara (2013), p. 391. 
94 Mushamba et al. (2014), pp. 10, 15. 
95 See World Bank (1999), p. 120. 
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protection for local authorities to make their staffing decisions would have been welcomed 
by those who argue that the national government often abuses these powers. However, the 
administrative autonomy of local authorities, i.e. their powers to hire and fire staff is not 
explicitly guaranteed in the Constitution. Section 276, discussed above, provides for generic 
powers to administer but this is made subject to the Constitution and national 
legislation. Section 279 also states that legislation must provide for the procedure to be 
followed by councils of local authorities.96 Both provisions suggest that national government 
will determine the precise contours of local administrative autonomy in ordinary legislation. 
It is submitted, however, that the constitutional entrenchment of local government and the 
adoption of the constitutional principle of devolution must shape the interpretation of 
section 276 of the Constitution. This provision guarantees local authorities a certain 
measure of administrative autonomy given its importance to effective governance. 
Arguably, the ‘right to govern’ includes the power to appoint and fire personnel as well as 
to determine internal administrative procedures. Similarly, the term ‘on its own initiative’ 
assumes that a local authority should be able to make individual decisions to hire and fire 
personnel within a framework determined by the national government. Moreover the 
Constitution allocates to local authorities ‘‘all’’ the powers necessary to ‘‘govern’’ whether 
with respect to personnel establishment or the determination of internal administrative 
procedures. 
 
The City of Harare adopted this interpretation of section 276 when it appointed James 
Mushore as its town clerk in 2016. Contrary to section 132 of the Urban Councils Act, the 
City did not seek the approval of the Local Government Board. It argued that it has full 
authority under the Constitution to make the appointment. The national government 
responded by issuing a directive purportedly rescinding the appointment of Mushore as 
town clerk. The City and civic groups have since brought a High Court application, 
petitioning the Court to clarify the powers local authorities enjoy under the Constitution 
with regard to appointment of staff. If the City’s approach is upheld, the provisions of the 
Urban Councils Act and Rural District Councils97 providing for interference by the Local 
Government Board or the Minister in staffing decisions, will have to be revisited. 
 
In summary, while there is no explicit constitutional protection for local administrative 
autonomy, the Constitution contains provisions that suggest that there are limits to the 
extent to which national government may interfere in staffing decisions. 
 
5.6 The Supervision of Local Authorities 
Supervision, as argued in paragraph 2.6, is a ‘reflection of the fact that, albeit endowed 
with [local] autonomy, a local authority is not a sovereign entity and is part of the overall 
state machinery’.98 Thus, the supervision of local government— through regulation, 
monitoring, support and intervention—is a necessary component of the decentralisation 
regime. The question is whether the 2013 Constitution provides for  the supervision  of 
                                                          
96 Section 279 Constitution. 
97 These are: section 132, 133, 134, 116, 123, 128, 129, 130 Urban Councils Act; Section 66 Rural District Councils Act. 
98 Panara (2013), p. 383. 
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local  authorities. National supervision of local authorities is necessary in order to combat 
corruption and minimise the wastage of resources. The Constitution requires the 
Parliament to supervise public debt, finances, and the use of borrowing powers by all 
government including, local authorities.99 Parliament also has an obligation to ‘monitor and 
oversee’ expenditure by local authorities and to enact legislation to give full effect to its  
financial oversight role. The Constitution also establishes the office of the Auditor-General to 
audit the accounts, financials systems and financial management of local authorities, among 
other duties.100  
 
These two supervisory roles are reasonably clear and constitute critical features of the 
decentralisation design. However, the Constitution leaves a gap when it comes to the 
executive supervision by the national government. There is nothing in the Constitution that 
provides for the supervision of local authorities by the national or provincial government. 
This means, therefore, that there are also no explicit constitutional limits on the use of 
supervisory powers.101 There is then a risk that local authorities are not treated equally 
when it comes to the national executive supervising local government. This is all the more 
pertinent in a local government environment that is politically charged and where the ruling 
party at national government level is different from the party that controls key local 
government institutions. This has been the case in Zimbabwe since 2000 102 
 
Current local government legislation equips the national Minister responsible for local 
government with virtually unlimited supervisory powers. These powers are often used 
excessively, raising concerns among scholars about the abuse of supervision powers for 
political ends.103 In fact, the toxic central-local relationship is often cited as one of the 
reasons why the local government system is failing to deliver basic services.104 At the same 
time, the excessive supervision by the Minister was almost done in line with the law, which 
gave the Minister extensive supervision powers.105  
 
The drafters of the Constitution had the opportunity to clarify central-local relationships and, 
in particular, specify the scope of supervision powers. However, the Constitution leaves this 
to Parliament to regulate. It can be argued, again, that the constitutional principle of 
devolution and the constitutional ‘right to govern’ of local authorities must be interpreted to 
limit Parliament’s discretion in regulating the supervision of local government. Parliament 
must strike a balance between the need for supervision and need for local autonomy. It is 
submitted that the extensive supervisory powers of the Minister responsible for local 
government, which were designed under the now repealed Lancaster House constitutional 
order, must be revisited. 
 
                                                          
99 Section 299(1) Constitution. 
100 Section 309(2) Constitution. 
101 Sims (2013), p. 13. 
102 Mushamba et al. (2014), p. 10; Chigwata (2017), p. 222. 
103 Muchadenyika (2015), p. 125; Mushamba et al. (2014), p. 10. 
104 See Chakunda (2015), p. 4. 
105 See Mushamba (2010), pp. 113–116; Chakunda (2015), p. 1. 
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6 Conclusion 
This article set out to assess the autonomy afforded to local government under the 2013 
Constitution of Zimbabwe. It was argued that the Constitution protects locally elected 
officials from being suspended or dismissed arbitrarily by the national government. 
However, the national legislation that was adopted to give effect to this protection contains 
provisions that go against this. Aside from the reasonably clear provisions that protect local 
democracy, the Constitution actually does not provide many hard rules guaranteeing the 
other basic features of local autonomy. The Constitution merely provides generic powers 
and functions of local government, the detail of which will depend on national legislation. 
It does not specify revenue raising powers and also does not limit the supervision of local 
authorities by the national executive. However, the intent to devolve power, responsibilities 
and resources is a prominent feature of the Constitution. Combined with the sacred 
phrase, in section 276 of the Constitution, that local authorities have ‘the right to govern’ 
there is scope for the argument that a degree of local autonomy is in fact protected by the 
Constitution. Much will depend on how the courts will interpret section 276 of the 
Constitution. 
 
At the time of writing, the legislative regime for local government had not yet been 
brought in line with the Constitution, barring a few minor changes. The virtually 
unrestrained supervisory powers afforded to the national governments remain in place. 
This brings into question the commitment towards the establishment of a decentralised 
system of government under which local authorities enjoy the  degree  of  local  autonomy  
necessary  to  reap  the  benefits  associated  with decentralisation. 
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